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Abstract 
The present research focused on motivational and personality traits measuring 
individual differences in the experience of negative affect, in reactivity to negative 
events, and in the tendency to avoid threats. In this thesis, such traits (i.e., neuroticism 
and dispositional avoidance motivation) are jointly referred to as trait avoidance 
motivation. The seven studies presented here examined the moderators of such traits in 
predicting risk judgments, negatively biased processing, and adjustment.  
Given that trait avoidance motivation encompasses reactivity to negative events and 
tendency to avoid threats, it can be considered surprising that this trait does not seem to 
be related to risk judgments and that it seems to be inconsistently related to negatively 
biased information processing. Previous work thus suggests that some variable(s) 
moderate these relations. Furthermore, recent research has suggested that despite the 
close connection between trait avoidance motivation and (mal)adjustment, measures of 
cognitive performance may moderate this connection. However, it is unclear whether 
this moderation is due to different response processes between individuals with different 
cognitive tendencies or abilities, or to the genuinely buffering effect of high cognitive 
ability against the negative consequences of high trait avoidance motivation. 
Studies 1-3 showed that there is a modest direct relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and risk judgments, but studies 2-3 demonstrated that state motivation 
moderates this relation. In particular, individuals in an avoidance state made high risk 
judgments regardless of their level of trait avoidance motivation. This result explained 
the disparity between the theoretical conceptualization of avoidance motivation and the 
results of previous studies suggesting that the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and risk judgments is weak or nonexistent. Studies 5-6 examined threat 
identification tendency as a moderator for the relationship between trait avoidance 
motivation and negatively biased processing. However, no evidence for such 
moderation was found. Furthermore, in line with previous work, the results of studies 5-
6 suggested that trait avoidance motivation is inconsistently related to negatively biased 
processing, implying that theories concerning traits and information processing may 
need refining. Study 7 examined cognitive ability as a moderator for the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and adjustment, and demonstrated that cognitive 
ability moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation and indicators of both 
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self-reported and objectively measured adjustment. Thus, the results of Study 7 
supported the buffer explanation for the moderating influence of cognitive performance. 
To summarize, the results showed that it is possible to find factors that consistently 
moderate the relations between traits and important outcomes (e.g. adjustment). 
Identifying such factors and studying their interplay with traits is one of the most 
important goals of current personality research. The present thesis contributed to this 
line of work in relation to trait avoidance motivation. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä väitöskirja keskittyi motivaatio- ja persoonallisuuspiirteisiin, jotka mittaavat 
yksilöiden välisiä eroja kielteisten tunteiden kokemisessa, herkkyydessä reagoida 
kielteisiin tapahtumiin ja ärsykkeisiin, sekä taipumuksessa välttää uhkia. Näihin 
piirteisiin viitataan tässä tutkimuksessa yhteisnimityksellä piirrevälttämismotivaatio. 
Väitöskirjassa esitellyt seitsemän tutkimusta selvittivät tekijöitä, jotka muokkaavat 
piirrevälttämismotivaation yhteyttä riskiarvioihin, kielteisen tiedon käsittelyyn, sekä 
yleiseen hyvinvointiin ja toimintakykyyn.  
Vaikka piirrevälttämismotivaatio käsittää yksilöiden väliset erot reaktioissa 
kielteisiin asioihin sekä taipumuksessa välttää uhkia, tämä piirre ei vaikuta juuri olevan 
yhteydessä riskiarvioihin, ja piirteen yhteydet kielteisen tiedon käsittelyyn ovat 
epäjohdonmukaisia. Näin ollen aikaisempi tutkimus viittaa siihen, että jokin tekijä 
muokkaa näitä yhteyksiä. Piirrevälttämismotivaatio on myös voimakkaassa yhteydessä 
(alhaiseen) psyykkiseen hyvinvointiin ja toimintakykyyn, mutta viimeaikaiset 
tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet, että yksilölliset erot kognitiivisissa taipumuksissa tai 
kyvyissä voivat muokata tätä yhteyttä. Ei kuitenkaan ole selvää, johtuuko tämä 
kognitiivisilta taipumuksiltaan eroavien ihmisten erilaisista vastaustaipumuksista, vai 
kognitiivisen kyvykkyyden suojaavasta vaikutuksesta korkean 
piirrevälttämismotivaation kielteisiä seurauksia vastaan. 
Tutkimukset 1-3 osoittivat, että piirrevälttämismotivaation ja riskiarvioiden välillä on 
heikohko suora yhteys, mutta tutkimusten 2-3 tulokset osoittivat lisäksi, että 
motivaatiotilat muokkaavat tätä yhteyttä: välttämismotivaatiotilassa olevat henkilöt 
tekivät korkeita riskiarvioita riippumatta piirrevälttämismotivaationsa tasosta. Tämä 
tulos selitti ristiriitaa piirrevälttämismotivaation teorian ja piirrevälttämismotivaation ja 
riskiarvioiden välisen suhteen heikkoudesta kertovien aiempien tulosten välillä. Sen 
sijaan yksilöiden väliset erot uhkien tunnistamisessa eivät vaikuttaneet 
piirrevälttämismotivaation ja kielteisen tiedon käsittelyn väliseen suhteeseen 
(tutkimukset 5-6). Kielteisen tiedon käsittelyä koskevat tulokset olivat aikaisempien 
tulosten tavoin epäjohdonmukaisia ja viittaavat siihen, että piirteiden ja tiedonkäsittelyn 
yhteyttä koskevia teorioita pitäisi tarkentaa. Tutkimus 7 selvitti kognitiivisen 
kyvykkyyden vaikutusta piirrevälttämismotivaation ja psyykkisen toimintakyvyn 
väliseen suhteeseen. Tulokset osoittivat, että kognitiivinen kyvykkyys muokkaa 
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piirrevälttämismotivaation yhteyttä sekä itsearvioituun että objektiivisesti arvioituun 
toimintakykyyn. Tulokset tukivat teoriaa, jonka mukaan kognitiivinen kyvykkyys 
aidosti suojaa ihmisiä korkean välttämismotivaation kielteisiltä vaikutuksilta. 
Väitöskirjan tulokset tuottivat uutta tietoa välttämismotivaation vaikutuksia 
muokkaavista tekijöistä. Tällaisten tekijöiden tunnistaminen ja niiden ja 
persoonallisuuden yhteisvaikutusten tutkiminen on yksi 
nykypersoonallisuustutkimuksen tärkeimmistä tavoitteista, ja tämä väitöskirja osallistui 
tähän tutkimuslinjaan piirrevälttämismotivaation osalta. 
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1 Introduction 
Four decades ago, it was suggested that there is no cross-situational consistency in 
behavior – i.e., that broad personality traits do not exist, or, even if they do exist, that 
they are essentially unrelated to how we behave (Mischel, 1968; Raush, 1965; Shweder, 
1975). At that time, these suggestions were, to some extent, justified (Bem, 1972; Bem 
& Allen, 1974; but see Funder, 2009). However, the tables have turned. The trait 
approach to personality has been triumphant in two respects. First, we can now be 
relatively confident about which traits subsume the broad individual differences in 
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & Costa, 
1987). Second, broad traits do predict behavior, and sometimes they do so quite 
strongly and consistently (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, 
Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). 
The successful state of trait psychology today is not (merely) a happy end, but a 
starting point to a whole new set of questions (Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2009; 
Funder, 2009; Mischel, 2004; Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). These 
questions include: How does personality affect behavior? Why does it affect behavior? 
When does it affect behavior? And, what kind of entities are personality traits? What in 
a person’s mind underlies the different trait scores? To answer these questions, it does 
not suffice to say that a person did something – say, talked a lot – because she stands at 
a certain level of a certain trait, for instance, because she has a high extraversion score, 
although such observations can be very interesting and important. But we also need to 
ask what happens in the mind of an extraverted person when she starts to talk and when 
she keeps on talking, and what happens when she faces internal or external pressure to 
stop  talking.  In  other  words,  now  that  we  know  the  essentials  of  the  structure  of  
personality, we need to start focusing on the internal dynamics of personality (Cervone, 
2005) and on the processes between traits, other dispositions, situations, and behavior 
(Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2008; Fournier et al., 2009; Funder, 2009; Mischel, 
2004). 
The present research aims to provide some answers to the questions described above. 
The main focus is on the “when” question in the context of such traits that are relevant 
to the experience of and susceptibility to negative emotional experience, and to the 
tendency to avoid negative issues. Previous literature has shown that some of the 
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relations between such traits and some theoretically relevant variables are weak or 
inconsistent – i.e., sometimes there is a relation, sometimes not. In the present thesis, it 
is suggested that these relations are moderated by certain other variables, and seven 
empirical studies try to specify when these relations can be found, and why. 
1.1 Trait avoidance motivation 
Which exactly are those traits that encompass individual differences in (a) the 
experience of negative affect, (b) reactivity to negative events, and (c) the strength of 
avoidance motivation (i.e., individual differences in the willingness to avoid negative 
issues), and how are these traits related to each other and established trait taxonomies? 
Trait models incorporating one or more negative dimensions similar to those described 
above can be divided into two classes. The first types of models are rooted in 
motivation research. In the past few decades, several different motivational theories 
have suggested that at its core, behavior is regulated by two systems: a behavioral 
approach system, responsible for approaching desired, positive issues, and a behavioral 
inhibition/avoidance system, responsible for withdrawing from and avoiding 
threatening, dangerous, and unwanted issues (e.g. Carver, Sutton, Scheier, 2000; 
Cloninger, 1987; Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Higgins, 1998); 1 naturally, 
this latter system is relevant to the present research. The idea of approach and avoidance 
systems guiding behavior is commonsensical, and by no means a new thought (e.g. 
Miller, 1944). Although motivational research often deals with intraindividual processes 
rather than with between-person constructs, approach-avoidance motivation theorists 
have posited that there are individual differences in the sensitivity of the motivation 
systems (e.g. Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1994; Smillie, 2008). Furthermore, 
individual differences in the strength of avoidance motivation system are related to the 
frequency of negative affective experiences in everyday life (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 
2000), to stronger negative reactions when anticipating a negative event or after a 
negative event (Carver & White, 1994; Gable et al., 2000), and to avoidance behavior 
(Peters & Slovic, 2000). 
                                               
1 In reinforcement sensitivity theory, avoidance behavior is actually controlled by two systems; one 
controlling reactions to aversive stimuli and one controlling initial reactions to goal conflict (Gray, 1982; 
Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
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The second type of theories incorporating a “negative” trait dimension concern 
individual differences in personality. The dimension of neuroticism (vs. emotional 
stability) is included in all major trait models of personality (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 
1992; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), and such a dimension 
practically always emerges in empirical studies examining the structure of personality 
(Barrett, Petrides, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1998; Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1985; 
1987; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, & Camac, 1988). Neuroticism can be defined as a stable 
tendency to experience negative affects, self-consciousness, and insecurity (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). 
As suggested by the above review of dispositional avoidance motivation and 
neuroticism, these traits share many features, both theoretically and empirically (Carver, 
Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 
2000; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1984). Indeed, 
measures of neuroticism are usually at least moderately correlated with measures of 
dispositional avoidance motivation (Carver & White, 1994; Jorm, Christensen, 
Henderson, Jacomb, Korten, & Rodgers, 1998), and some studies utilizing structural 
equation modeling have suggested that measures of neuroticism and dispositional 
avoidance motivation load on the same latent factor (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2003; Elliot 
& Thrash, 2002; Smits & Boek, 2006; see also Carver et al., 2000). Furthermore, both 
traits predict stronger negative reactions toward negative stimuli (Carver & White, 
1994; Gable et al., 2000; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). The two avoidance motivation 
systems specified by revised reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000, see also Footnote 1), perhaps the most prominent of the approach-avoidance 
motivation theories, have also been suggested to exist as two distinct but correlated 
aspects within neuroticism (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). The notion that trait 
neuroticism encompasses the dispositional avoidance motivation (or vice versa) is also 
implicit in some interpretations of reinforcement sensitivity theory (Smillie, 2008). 
Further evidence for partial overlap between systems controlling negative affect and 
avoidance behavior comes from research suggesting that negative affects and reactions 
serve as signals that inform the avoidance system of danger and of the need to withdraw 
from certain objects or situations (Barrett, 2006; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; 
Chen & Bargh, 1999). For example, people push a lever away from them (vs. pull it 
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towards them) more quickly when evaluating negative (vs. positive) stimuli (Chen & 
Bargh, 1999). These results suggest that negative affective evaluations automatically 
evoke a tendency toward avoidance behavior.  
The above discussion suggests that traits tapping the experience of negative affect 
and traits measuring avoidance motivation have quite a lot in common, although it is yet 
unclear whether one of the traits can be reduced to the other. For the purposes of the 
present dissertation, in which dispositional avoidance motivation and neuroticism are 
studied, I introduce a composite trait term trait avoidance motivation,  which  refers  
jointly to these two traits. The focus on these “negative” traits serves as the first of two 
overarching themes of the present dissertation. However, at the same time, I 
acknowledge that along with these common features, dispositional avoidance 
motivation and neuroticism also carry unique features, and that these different traits 
may have distinct relationships with other variables. The point of introducing a broad 
negative composite trait concept is to enable a coherent discussion of the rationale of the 
research and of the results. Most of the previous results discussed below concern both of 
these traits. However, sometimes the results under discussion or the research questions 
posed in the present studies are more relevant to one of the traits  than to the other.  In 
those cases, this is particularly noted in the text. 
The term trait avoidance motivation is chosen to serve as the label of the negative 
composite trait because it is not currently used exclusively by any one personality 
theory, and therefore does not carry connotations particular to these theories, but can be 
used to refer generally to individual differences in negative affects and reactions and in 
the strength of avoidance motivation. It is important to keep in mind that in the present 
thesis,  this  term  refers  equally  to  each  of  the  traits  of  neuroticism  and  dispositional  
avoidance motivation, and that the use of this general term does not suggest that these 
traits are identical or reducible into each other.  
1.2 The “when” and “what” of trait avoidance motivation 
Individual differences in the experience of negative affects and reactions, referred to 
in  this  thesis  as  trait  avoidance  motivation,  seem  to  be  related  to  almost  every  
conceivable psychological problem, deviance, distress, and abnormality (e.g., Claridge 
& Davis, 2001; Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005), such as low subjective well-being 
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(Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008), clinical depression and anxiety disorders (Kasch, 
Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002; Watson et al., 2005), problems in emotion 
regulation (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001), somatic distress (Neeleman, Bijl, & Ormel, 
2004), stronger negative reactions to negative events (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000), and 
many others (Claridge & Davis, 2001). Almost as a rule, if there is something 
distressing to be found in the human mind, high trait avoidance motivation is right there 
by its side. Therefore, a few exceptions to this rule in the literature stand out. 
The present research focuses on two of the exceptions mentioned above and tries to 
uncover some reasons for them. In so doing, this research aims to provide some answers 
to the “when” question presented in the beginning of the Introduction by studying 
certain moderators of trait avoidance motivation. Focusing on the moderators of traits 
serves as the second overarching theme of this dissertation. 
The first exception of those mentioned above is that, despite its status as the predictor 
of  negative  issues,  trait  avoidance  motivation  does  not  seem  to  be  related  to  risk  
judgments (e.g., Hampson, Andrews, Barckley, Lichtenstein, & Lee, 2006; Vollrath, 
Knoch, & Cassano, 1999). Related to this, although trait avoidance motivation seems to 
be related to negatively biased information processing (Chan, Goodwin, & Harmer, 
2007; Gomez & Gomez, 2002; Gomez, Gomez, & Cooper, 2002), this relation is quite 
inconsistently found (Bradley & Mogg, 1994; Bradley, Mogg, Galbraith, & Perrett, 
1993; Chan et al., 2007; Mathews & Milroy, 1994; Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting, 
1998; Rusting & Larsen, 1998). The present studies examine these relations and 
potential moderators for them in order to clarify when trait avoidance motivation is 
related to risk judgments and negatively biased processing, and when it is not. It is 
hypothesized that state motivation obscures the relationship between trait avoidance 
motivation and risk judgments because state and trait avoidance motivation could have 
similar consequences with regards to reactions to risks (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 
1997; Lang, 1995). Furthermore, based on recent research suggesting that individual 
differences in threat identification moderate the relation of trait avoidance motivation 
with life satisfaction and negative affect (Tamir, Robinson, & Solberg, 2006), it is 
hypothesized that a threat identification tendency moderates the relation between trait 
avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing. 
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The second exception emerges from quite a few recent studies suggesting that trait 
avoidance motivation’s adverse adjustment-related consequences are not as inevitable 
as previously thought (Perkins & Corr, 2005; 2006; Robinson & Clore, 2007). In other 
words, some high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals may be able to escape the 
negative effects of the trait. However, on the basis of previous research it is not clear 
whether some variable(s) genuinely alleviate the negative effects of high trait 
avoidance, or whether the results mentioned above are only an artifact of the response 
process (Perkins & Corr, 2006; Robinson & Clore, 2007). By stringing together 
previous research and by an empirical examination, it is suggested that some high-trait-
avoidance individuals are indeed able to escape many harmful correlates of the trait, and 
that a key moderator for the relation between trait avoidance motivation and these 
correlates is cognitive ability. 
In studying the cognitive correlates of trait avoidance motivation, this thesis also 
aims at providing some answers to the “what” question. This question is much more 
profound and difficult than the “when” question, and the present research can provide 
only a very incomplete answer to it. Previous research concerning this question can be 
divided into two, interrelated lines: One tries to connect traits with genetics and neural 
properties (e.g., Canli, 2008; Lake, Eaves, Maes, Heath, & Martin, 2000; Ormel, 
Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004) and the other with cognitive structures and processes 
(Borkenau & Mauer, 2007; Gomez, Cooper, McOrmond, & Tatlow, 2004; Robinson, 
Ode, Moeller, & Goetz, 2007; Rusting, 1998; 1999). The studies presented here join the 
latter research line. A range of negative processing biases and their relation to trait 
avoidance motivation are examined. In so doing, the present studies try to increase our 
knowledge about the cognitive aspects of trait avoidance motivation. 
1.3 Trait-congruency theory 
A long-maintained idea in personality and social psychology as well as in clinical 
psychology is that personality traits predispose individuals to process information and 
make judgments in a way congruent with their traits (e.g. Beck, 1976; King & 
Sorrentino, 1988; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Rusting, 1998). In the context of 
avoidance motivation, this trait-congruency theory suggests that those with high trait 
avoidance motivation are quicker to attend to negative information, process it more 
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effectively, recall it better, interpret neutral information in a more negative way, and 
make more negative judgments than individuals with low trait avoidance motivation 
(Gomez et al., 2002; Rusting, 1998; Rusting & Larsen, 1998; Zelenski & Larsen, 2002). 
Trait-congruency theory is attractive for many reasons. First of all, it is intuitively 
appealing. People with high levels of emotional traits experience trait-congruent affects 
more frequently (Costa & McCrae, 1980) and react more strongly to trait-congruent 
events (Gable et al., 2000) than individuals low in these traits. Furthermore, high-trait-
avoidance motivation individuals describe their important memories as sadder and less 
pleasant than low-trait-avoidance motivation individuals (McAdams, Anyidoho, Brown, 
Huang, Kapland, & Machado, 2004). It seems plausible that more frequent experiences 
with and sensitivity to events with a certain valence could enhance the processing of 
stimuli with this valence. Concerning trait avoidance motivation and negative 
judgments, it also seems plausible that a motivation to avoid negative issues might 
cause high-trait-avoidance individuals to judge negative issues more negatively, as such 
judgments (e.g., judging risks as highly likely) could help ensure that one avoids those 
negative issues. This view is broadly compatible with, for instance, the hierarchical 
model of approach and avoidance motivation (e.g., Elliot & Church, 1997), according to 
which cognitive structures, such as goals, mediate the relation between motivational 
dispositions and outcome variables such as subjective well-being and behavior. High 
trait avoidance motivation is related to maintaining avoidance goals (Elliot, Sheldon, & 
Church, 1997), and judging the to-be-avoided issues as more likely could contribute to 
achieving these goals. 
The second reason for why the trait-congruency theory is attractive is related to the 
“new set of questions” presented in the beginning of the Introduction. As already 
mentioned, establishing a connection between trait avoidance motivation and negatively 
biased judgment and processing could provide us with at least partial answer to the 
“what” question presented above by uncovering some cognitive aspects of the trait. 
Third, the connections between traits and cognitive processes could suggest a way to 
answer the “how” question also. To illustrate, to explain why high-trait-avoidance 
motivation individuals experience higher negative mood than low-trait-avoidance 
motivation individuals in response to negative events (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000; 
Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991), we could refer to the tendencies of high-trait-avoidance 
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motivation individuals to pay more attention to the negative features of an event or to 
evaluate the event as more negative. 
The connections between trait avoidance motivation and cognitive biases have been 
much studied (Bradley & Mogg, 1994; Bradley et al., 1993; Derryberry & Reed, 1994; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting, 1998; Young & Martin, 
1981; Zelenski & Larsen, 2002). Rather surprisingly, no clear conclusions can be drawn 
from this body of research. To be sure, quite a few studies have found a positive relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing (Chan et al., 2007; 
Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Gomez et al., 2004; Gomez et al., 2002; Rusting & Larsen, 
1998 (Study 2); Young & Martin, 1981; Zelenski & Larsen, 2002). That is, those with 
high trait avoidance motivation tend to recall negative information better, attend to it 
more, and interpret neutral information in a more negative way than those with low trait 
avoidance motivation. However, these relations are typically weak, and for each of the 
processes mentioned above, there are also studies showing no relations (Bradley et al., 
1993; Chan et al., 2007; Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting, 1998; Rusting & Larsen, 
1998, Study 1).  
In the studies presented here, the relations between trait avoidance motivation and 
negative cognitive biases are examined. The aim is to uncover some reasons for the 
weakness and inconsistency of these relations. Measures of negative biases related to 
recall, interpretation, and judgment are administered to several samples of participants. 
Furthermore, the present thesis draws from previous research and theorizing to propose 
two moderators for the relation between trait avoidance motivation and negatively 
biased judgment and processing. Specifically, it is suggested that state motivation 
moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments, and that 
individual differences in threat identification moderate the relationship between trait 
avoidance motivation and negative processing biases. 
A particular focus of the present research is on the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and self-reports of risk judgments. This relation could be expected to be 
quite strong, as trait avoidance motivation is thought to subsume most or all important 
individual differences in reactivity to and willingness to avoid negative issues, such as 
risks. However, correlations between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments 
have been consistently weak (rs around .12) or nonexistent in previous research 
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(Gullone & Moore, 2000; Hampson et al., 2006; Peters, Burraston, & Mertz, 2004; 
Vollrath et al., 1999).2 Given the theoretical conceptualization of the trait, there is a 
need to examine reasons for the weakness of this relation. Study 1 (Article I) examines 
this relation in a large sample of participants, and Studies 2 and 3 examine whether state 
motivation moderates this relationship.  
The theoretical rationale for the connection between trait avoidance motivation and 
risk judgments is based on the connection of trait avoidance motivation with reactivity 
to and willingness to avoid negative issues. Therefore, the research questions 
concerning risk judgments are more related to the dispositional avoidance motivation 
component than to the neuroticism component of the trait avoidance motivation 
composite.  Furthermore, most studies showing low or nonexistent relations between 
trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments have used measures of neuroticism as an 
indicator of trait avoidance motivation (e.g. Gullone & Moore, 2000; Hampson et al., 
2006). It seems possible that measures tapping individual differences in dispositional 
avoidance motivation could be more strongly related to risk judgments than measures of 
neuroticism. Accordingly, a measure of dispositional avoidance motivation is used in 
the present risk judgment studies (1-3). Furthermore, a measure of trait anxiety, a 
subtrait of neuroticism, is used in Study 1. If risk judgments are related to neuroticism, 
the strongest relations should be found for this subtrait, since of all negative emotions, 
anxiety is the most likely to predict reactions to risks. 
1.4 Trait avoidance motivation and negative biases: Potential 
moderators 
Relations between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments and negatively biased 
processing are theoretically plausible, but empirically weak or inconsistent. One reason 
for this could be that these relations are moderated by some third variable. The present 
                                               
2 There is some evidence for somewhat higher relations (around r = .35) between trait avoidance 
motivation and self-relevant judgments of negative future events (Borkenau & Mauer, 2006; Zelenski & 
Larsen, 2002). However, given that trait avoidance motivation is strongly related to trait pessimism (e.g., 
Marshall, Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers Jr, 1992), the items used in these negative judgment 
studies (e.g., becoming homeless, being diagnosed with cancer) may overlap conceptually with the items 
measuring trait avoidance motivation. That is, pessimistic judgments may derive from the same source of 
within-person negativity as responses to trait avoidance motivation measures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Watson & Clark, 1984). In contrast to such connections, the current research is 
concerned with risk judgment tendencies that are conceptually unrelated to trait avoidance motivation and 
with the possible empirical connection between such risk judgments and trait avoidance motivation.  
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research studies two such potential moderators: state motivation and a threat 
identification tendency. These moderators and their relevance to trait avoidance 
motivation and cognitive biases are discussed next. 
1.4.1 State avoidance motivation and risk judgments 
As  noted  above,  trait  avoidance  motivation  could  be  expected  to  have  a  strong  
relation with risk judgments because trait avoidance motivation subsumes practically all 
important individual differences in reactions to negative stimuli and in the willingness 
to avoid danger. However, not all negative reactions derive from within-person factors: 
situations can evoke a state of avoidance that can make people temporarily highly 
reactive to negative issues (Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
This makes sense, as those with low trait avoidance motivation must also be able to 
withdraw from a threatening situation. Given that the consequences of an avoidance 
state (vigilance to threats, anxiety, readiness to withdraw from a situation) are very 
similar to those of high trait avoidance motivation (Globisch, Hamm, Esteves, & 
Öhman, 1999; Higgins et al., 1997), state avoidance motivation could be related to a 
temporary increase in risk judgments. Furthermore, many stimuli and situations evoke a 
momentary state of avoidance (Higgins, 2002; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; 
Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003); therefore, people are probably often in an 
avoidance state regardless of the level of their trait avoidance motivation. As a 
consequence, those in an avoidance state could make high risk judgments regardless of 
their level of trait avoidance motivation. Thus, an interaction between state and trait 
avoidance motivation could have diminished the correlation between trait avoidance 
motivation and risk judgments in previous studies. 
Studying a state × trait avoidance motivation interaction on an avoidance-related 
cognitive variable (risk judgments) also allows an examination of the nature of the 
avoidance system. It has been suggested that matching states and traits could affect 
relevant outcomes synergistically (Rusting, 1999). In the context of trait avoidance 
motivation, this would mean that a high trait avoidance motivation enhances the effects 
of an avoidance state so that high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals make 
particularly  high  risk  judgments  when they  are  in  an  avoidance  state  (as  compared  to  
individuals who are in an approach state or in a motivationally neutral state). However, 
there is evidence that the avoidance system might be different in this respect (Shah & 
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Higgins, 1997). In particular, because the avoidance motivation system deals with 
avoiding dangers and threats, it could be that this system starts working at full strength 
when a certain threshold of activation has been reached. Not reaching avoidance goals 
could be dangerous; therefore, it might be adaptive for the system to fully activate when 
a certain threshold is reached. The avoidance system of the high-trait-avoidance 
motivation individuals could be chronically operating above this threshold, whereas 
evoking an avoidance state could push all individuals temporarily above the threshold. 
This model (Shah & Higgins, 1997) therefore predicts that individuals with high trait 
avoidance would make similar (equally high) risk judgments regardless of their 
motivational states, and that individuals in an avoidance state would make similar risk 
judgments regardless of their level of trait avoidance motivation.  
Although the predictions made in this thesis concerning the moderators of trait 
avoidance motivation differ for risk judgments vs. emotional processing (the latter 
being discussed in the next chapter), it seems possible that state motivation could also 
moderate the relation between trait avoidance motivation and negatively biased 
processing. For instance, state avoidance motivation could make negative concepts 
more accessible and enhance negatively biased interpretation for individuals in an 
avoidance state regardless of their level of trait avoidance motivation. Therefore, state × 
trait avoidance motivation effects on negative interpretation are also examined.  
In  sum,  Studies  2  and  3  (presented  in  Article  II)  examine  the  idea  that  state  
avoidance motivation moderates the association of trait avoidance motivation with risk 
judgments, and compare the two theories described above. Health risks are used as 
judgments of such risks have shown weak or nonexistent correlations with trait 
avoidance motivation in previous research (e.g., Hampson et al., 2006) and are not 
likely to be conceptually overlapping with items measuring trait avoidance motivation 
(see Footnote 2). Furthermore, the potential moderating effect of state motivation on the 
relation between trait avoidance motivation and negative interpretation is studied in 
Study 4 (Article II).  
1.4.2 Threat identification and negatively biased processing 
Given  the  ubiquity  of  trait  avoidance  motivation  as  a  predictor  of  psychological  
adversity, a recent series of studies has obtained somewhat surprising results. According 
to these studies, trait avoidance motivation is not directly related to daily negative affect 
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and life satisfaction, but these relations are moderated by individual differences in 
identifying threatening stimuli (Robinson, Wilkowski, Kirkeby, & Meier, 2006; Tamir 
et al., 2006). In particular, it was found that trait avoidance motivation predicted lower 
life satisfaction and higher negative affect only among those who were less skilled in 
identifying threatening stimuli (as measured by speed and accuracy in a categorization 
task). In contrast, for those who were quick and accurate in identifying threatening 
stimuli, there was no relation between trait avoidance motivation and affect or life 
satisfaction (Robinson et al., 2006; Tamir et al., 2006). 
The moderating effect of threat identification on the relation between trait avoidance 
and affect/life satisfaction was suggested by the authors to result from the beneficial 
effects of quick threat identification for high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals 
(Tamir et al., 2006). That is, as high-trait-avoidance individuals tend to worry about 
threatening issues, it might be helpful for them if they were able to quickly and 
accurately identify threatening stimuli. As a result, they could deal with actual threats 
more effectively and worry less about potential threats.  
If good threat-identification skills help high-trait-avoidance individuals to cope with 
threats, this could be reflected in their emotional processing biases as well as in their 
affective experience. That is, lower worry and more effective handling of threats could 
serve as a buffer against developing negative processing biases. As a result, only those 
high-trait-avoidance individuals who are less adept at identifying threatening stimuli 
would show a negative processing/judgment bias. By contrast, high-trait-avoidance 
individuals who are adept at threat identification might show a lesser bias or no bias at 
all. Hence, the moderating effect of threat identification tendency could, at least in part, 
explain the weak and inconsistent relation found between trait avoidance motivation and 
negative processing biases. Studies 5 and 6 (presented in Article III) examined this 
possibility. 
Both dispositional avoidance motivation and neuroticism components of trait 
avoidance motivation have been found to correlate with negatively biased processing. 
However,  the  rationale  for  Studies  5  and  6  is  based  on  the  relation  between  trait  
avoidance motivation and life satisfaction or negative affect (i.e., negative processing 
biases could accompany low life satisfaction or high negative affect, not high trait 
avoidance motivation as such), and the relation of neuroticism with life satisfaction and 
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negative affect is likely to be stronger than the relation between dispositional avoidance 
motivation and life satisfaction/negative affect. Dispositional avoidance motivation is 
mainly  related  to  sensitivity  to  negative  events  (e.g.  Carver  &  White,  1994),  whereas  
neuroticism is directly related to stable levels of negative affect (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 
1980). In addition, neuroticism also includes other facets that may be (negatively) 
related to life satisfaction, such as self-consciousness and vulnerability. Furthermore, 
previous studies have found a strong relation between neuroticism and life satisfaction 
(e.g. Steel et al., 2008). Therefore, a measure of neuroticism was used as an indicator of 
trait avoidance motivation in Studies 5 and 6. 
1.5 Trait avoidance motivation and adjustment: Inseparable or 
not? 
Are low well-being and unhappiness irrevocable consequences of high trait avoidance 
motivation? The answer provided by previous research has been a firm “yes” (e.g., 
Costa & McCrae, 1980; Gable et al., 2000; Steel et al., 2008), and although some 
studies have suggested that this relationship can sometimes be moderated (Lynn & 
Steel, 2006; Robinson et al., 2006), no coherent picture has emerged of the possible 
moderators. However, some recent research suggests that such a picture could now be 
forming.  The  present  thesis  ties  these  recent  advancements  together  with  the  aim  of  
showing that cognitive ability is a key moderator of the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and adjustment. 
Study 7 (presented in Article IV) builds on two separate lines of research which, 
when combined, offer new insights into the relation between trait avoidance motivation 
and (mal)adjustment. First, a series of studies examining trait avoidance motivation 
together with reaction time tasks have shown that trait avoidance motivation does not 
predict negative affect, somatic complaints, negative behaviors (e.g., worrying, self-
criticism), or life satisfaction among individuals who are fast, accurate, and/or flexible 
in reaction time tasks requiring categorization or identification of different stimuli 
(Robinson & Clore, 2007; Robinson et al., 2006). It should be noted here that the 
dependent variables (e.g., affect, life satisfaction) in these studies have been measured 
by self-reports. Another relevant line of research has studied cognitive ability as a 
moderator between trait avoidance motivation and job performance. Given the nature 
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and correlates of trait avoidance motivation, it is perhaps surprising that the trait is 
largely unrelated to job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991). However, Perkins and 
Corr (2005; 2006) found that trait avoidance motivation is negatively related to job 
performance and performance on an entrance examination, but only among individuals 
low in cognitive ability. For individuals high in cognitive ability, trait avoidance 
motivation had no relation with performance.  
Concerning studies in which reaction time performance has moderated the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and daily affect and well-being, the study authors 
have suggested that individuals with slow or persevering responses in reaction time 
tasks  would  be  less  able  to  focus  on  their  momentary  feelings  and  current  reality  
(Robinson & Clore, 2007; Robinson et al., 2006). As a result, these individuals would 
use  their  self-relevant  beliefs  instead  of  their  actual  experiences  to  reply  to  questions  
about their well-being and affect, and these same beliefs may also affect their trait 
reports. To illustrate, some individuals may perceive themselves as carefree and 
positive, and these self-beliefs may affect their trait self-reports (e.g., they would 
receive low scores on a trait avoidance motivation measure). Furthermore, when probed 
for their feeling states or well-being, those with difficulties focusing on their current 
feelings and experiences (i.e., those slow or perseverative in reaction time tasks) might 
draw from their  positive  self-beliefs  in  their  responses,  resulting  in  positive  reports  of  
feeling states and well-being. Because of this, negative correlations between trait 
avoidance motivation and well-being/affect would be stronger among individuals slow 
or perseverative in reaction time tasks as compared to individuals who show fast or 
flexible performance in these tasks. In contrast, the fast and flexible individuals would 
use  their  momentary  experiences  instead  of  their  self-beliefs  as  a  source  of  their  state  
self-reports. As noted above, this explanation of the obtained moderation effect assumes 
that performance in reaction time tasks could tap individual differences in ability to 
focus on and process momentary experiences and stimuli (Robinson & Clore, 2007). 
While reaction time performance could measure individual differences in the ability 
to focus on present reality, it is well established that reaction time performance is quite 
strongly related to cognitive ability or general intelligence (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, 
especially given the results of Perkins and Corr (2005; 2006), it seems possible that 
instead of a response process difference between fast vs. slow individuals in reaction 
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time tasks, differences in cognitive ability between these individuals could affect the 
relationship between trait avoidance motivation and affect/well-being. That is, high 
cognitive ability could genuinely buffer against the adverse effects of high trait 
avoidance motivation. 
To find out whether cognitive ability moderates the effects of trait avoidance 
motivation by affecting the response process or by serving as a buffer, Study 7 
examined the trait avoidance motivation × cognitive ability interaction on several 
indicators of adjustment. These indicators included self-reported, other-reported, and 
objective measures of performance, adjustment, and health. If the response process 
explanation is correct, the interaction between trait avoidance motivation and cognitive 
ability should only be significant for self-reported outcomes. However, a finding that 
cognitive ability moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation and other-
reported or objective measures of adjustment would support the idea that high cognitive 
ability genuinely helps high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals to cope. 
1.6 Summary 
To sum up, trait avoidance motivation does not seem to be reliably connected with risk 
judgment and negative processing biases, although such a connection could be expected 
given the conceptualization and other correlates of this trait. Furthermore, some recent 
research suggests that trait avoidance motivation does not predict adverse outcomes for 
all individuals, but on the basis of the previous research, the reasons for this are not 
clear. The present thesis examines the relation between trait avoidance motivation and 
risk judgment (Studies 1-3), and the relation between trait avoidance motivation and 
negatively biased processing (Studies 4-6), and tries to uncover some reasons for the 
weakness of these relations (Studies 2-6). Finally, cognitive ability as a moderator for 
the relation between trait avoidance motivation and adjustment is examined (Study 7). 
The research questions are graphically presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The research questions presented graphically. The two-headed, straight arrows depict direct 
relations between constructs. The one-headed, curved arrows represent a moderating influence on a direct 
relation between two constructs.  
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2 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
The seven studies presented here were designed to contribute to the research on the 
cognitive correlates of trait avoidance motivation on the one hand, and the moderators 
of trait avoidance motivation’s relations with emotional processing, judgment, and 
adjustment on the other. A list of the research questions is presented below, and Table 1 
gives an overview of the studies.  
 
(i) Is trait avoidance motivation related to risk judgments? A strong relation could 
be expected on the basis of most theoretical conceptualizations of trait 
avoidance motivation (Carver & White, 1994; Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Tellegen, 1985), but empirical studies have documented weak or nonexistent 
relations between the constructs (e.g., Gullone & Moore, 2000; Hampson et 
al., 2006). Therefore, no hypotheses were formed concerning this relation. 
 
(ii) Does state motivation moderate the relation between trait avoidance motivation 
and risk judgments?  Given that both high trait avoidance motivation and an 
avoidance state make people more reactive to negative stimuli (Lang et al., 
2000), and that both could thus raise risk judgments, state motivation could 
moderate this relation. 
Hypothesis (a): State motivation moderates the relationship between trait 
avoidance motivation and risk judgments because individuals in an 
avoidance state make high risk judgments regardless of their level of trait 
avoidance motivation. 
 
(iii) Is trait avoidance motivation directly related to negatively biased processing? 
Based on a long line of previous studies showing that the evidence for trait-
congruency in the context of trait avoidance motivation is inconsistent (e.g. 
Chan et al., 2007; Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting, 1998), no specific 
hypotheses were made concerning this research question. 
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(iv)  Do individual differences in the identification of threatening stimuli moderate 
the relation between trait avoidance motivation and emotional processing? Based on 
results showing that threat identification moderates the relation of trait avoidance 
motivation to emotional experience and life satisfaction (Tamir et al., 2006), threat 
identification could also moderate the relationship between trait avoidance 
motivation and negatively biased processing. 
Hypothesis (b): A threat identification tendency moderates the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing. In 
particular, among high-trait-avoidance individuals, those quick and 
accurate in identifying threatening stimuli are expected to show lower 
negative processing biases than those who are not quick and accurate in 
identifying threatening stimuli. 
 
(v)    Does cognitive ability moderate the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and adjustment? This research question dealt with the nature of the 
interaction between trait avoidance motivation and individual differences in tasks 
measuring cognitive performance. This interaction, found in some studies (Perkins 
& Corr, 2006; Robinson & Clore, 2007; Robinson et al., 2006), could be due to 
differences in the response processes of high vs. low cognitive ability individuals 
(Robinson & Clore, 2007) or to a genuine buffer effect of high cognitive ability 
(Perkins & Corr, 2006).  
Hypothesis (c): Trait avoidance motivation is negatively related to 
adjustment only among those with low cognitive ability. 
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Table 1. Overview of the studies 
 Article I Article II Article III Article IV 
Studies 1 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7 
 
Research 
questions 
 
i i, ii iii, iv v 
Participants Internet users University 
students 
University 
students 
Male conscripts 
N (Study 1, 
2…) 
1270 73, 82, 104 36, 53 152 
 
N of females/N 
of males 
645/625 55/18, 70/10, not 
known 
 
28/8, 46/7 0/152 
Trait avoidance 
motivation 
measure 
 
BIS, STAI BIS 
 
S5 Neuroticism 16 PF Neuroticism 
Other measures self-reports of 
health and diet 
quality 
Mood (Study 3) Threat vs. 
nonthreat 
categorization task 
(Studies 5-6) 
Mood (Study 6) 
 
Finnish Defence 
Forces BAT 
(measure of 
cognitive ability) 
Dependent 
variables 
Risk judgments Risk judgments 
(Studies 2-3), 
Negative 
interpretation 
(Study 4) 
Emotional 
interpretation 
(Studies 5-6), 
Emotional recall 
(Study 6) 
Self- and superior-
evaluated 
adjustment, 
Psychiatrist’s 
evaluation of self-
esteem and 
adjustment, 
Sick days 
Note. For the research questions, see Chapter 2. For more information on the measures and dependent 
variables, see Chapter 3. Only the measures relevant to the present hypotheses are included in Table 1. 
For a full description of the studies, see the original articles. 
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3 Methods and results 
3.1 Study 1 (Article I) 
The purpose  of  Study  1  was  to  test  in  a  large  and  representative  sample  whether  trait  
avoidance motivation is related to risk judgments and how strong this relation is. 
3.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited from a database of respondents upheld by a research 
company (Taloustutkimus Oy). The database consisted of a representative sample of 
Finnish adult internet users. An e-mail message was sent to 2540 members of the 
database asking if they were willing to participate in a food-related questionnaire study. 
The invitation message included a link to an internet questionnaire containing all the 
measures used in the study. The response rate was 50%, and the number of participants 
was 1270 (645 females and 625 males). The participants were, on average, 41 years old 
(age range: 18-77 years). The participants formed a near-representative sample of 
Finnish internet users concerning gender, age, education level, and work status (the 
participants were, on average, slightly better educated than Finnish internet users on 
average).  
3.1.2 Measures 
3.1.2.1 Risk judgments 
Risk judgments for six risks were included: (1) the risk of cancer as a result of eating 
dioxin-infested fish, (2) the risk of cardiovascular disease (CVD) as a result of a high-
fat diet, (3) the risk of food poisoning as a result of eating beef with EHEC-bacteria, (4) 
the unknown risks of genetically modified foods, (5) the unknown risks of vegetable 
sterols used in functional foods, and (6) the risk of contracting a human variant of 
Creutzfeld-Jacob disease as a result of eating beef infected with bovine spongiform 
encephalitis. Participants were provided with brief descriptions of each risk and they 
then rated on seven-point scales how scary (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) and likely for 
them (1 = very unlikely for me; 7 = very likely for me) the risks were. The scariness and 
likelihood ratings were subjected to exploratory factor analysis, which suggested a 
three-factor solution according to Kaiser’s eigenvalue rule. A parallel analysis also 
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supported a three-factor solution. Scariness judgments loaded on one factor and 
likelihood judgments on another factor with the exception of both judgments of CVD 
risk, which formed a third factor, and the likelihood judgments concerning cancer risk, 
which had equally strong loading on all three factors. Based on the factor analysis 
results, the cancer risk likelihood judgments were dropped, and the scariness judgments 
(exempting the judgments of CVD) and the likelihood judgments (exempting the 
judgments  of  cancer  and  CVD)  were  averaged  separately  to  create  indices  of  risk  
scariness (Cronbach’s ? = .76) and likelihood (? = .73). Further, judgments concerning 
CVD were averaged to create an index of CVD risk (? = 63).  
3.1.2.2 Trait avoidance motivation 
Trait avoidance motivation was measured by two self-report scales: the Behavioral 
Inhibition Scale (BIS) developed by Carver and White (1994), and the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983), short version (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). 
The BIS scale measures dispositional avoidance motivation and is composed of seven 
items (e.g., “If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty 
‘worked up’”). Responses were made on a five-point scale (1 = completely disagree; 5 = 
completely agree). The scale’s reliability (Cronbach’s ?) was .75. The STAI measures 
individual differences in the experience of anxiety and is composed of six items (e.g., 
“I’m upset”). The trait instructions were used; that is, participants were asked to respond 
according to how they usually feel. Responses were made on a four-point scale (1 = not 
at all; 4 = very much). Cronbach’s ? for the scale was .79. The BIS and the STAI had a 
correlation of .37 (p < .001). 
3.1.2.3 Health and dietary status 
Apart from individual differences in trait avoidance motivation, people’s health status 
and dietary habits may influence their food risk judgments. To control for these possible 
effects, self-evaluated health and diet status were measured: participants rated on seven-
point scales how they experienced their health status (1 = very bad; 7 = very good) and 
the healthiness of their diet (1 = not at all healthy; 7 = very healthy).  
3.1.3 Results 
Previous studies have shown weak relations between measures of trait avoidance 
motivation and risk judgments. The Pearson correlations were computed in order to test 
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this  relation.  Trait  avoidance  motivation  measured  by  the  BIS  correlated  with  risk  
scariness (r = .23, p < .001), risk likelihood (r = .16, p < .001), and CVD risk judgments 
(r = .18, p < .001). Trait avoidance motivation measured by the STAI also correlated 
with the risk judgments (r = .11, p < .001 for risk scariness,  r = .10, p < .001 for risk 
likelihood, and r = .09, p <  .01  for  CVD risk).  Hence,  as  could  be  expected  from the  
theoretical basis, trait avoidance motivation was positively related to risk judgments. 
However, this relation was by no means strong (average r = .15). 
    The potential confounding effects of self-rated health status and diet quality were 
studied by conducting three multiple regression analyses in which risk scariness, risk 
likelihood, and CVD risk judgments were separately regressed on trait anxiety, BIS, 
health status and diet quality. All relations between trait anxiety/BIS and risk judgments 
remained significant (p < .05) when controlling for these ratings. Therefore, the results 
suggested that health status and diet quality do not obscure the relation between trait 
avoidance motivation and risk judgments. 
3.2 Studies 2-4 (Article II) 
Studies 2 and 3 were designed to test the hypothesis that state motivation moderates the 
relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments (hypothesis a). Negative 
mood was measured in Study 3 in order to examine its possible mediating role in the 
relation between avoidance motivation and risk judgments. That is, avoidance 
motivation could affect risk judgments via stronger negative affective reactions to risks, 
and these reactions could be observable in negative mood. Furthermore, it was 
examined whether state motivation moderates the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and negatively biased interpretation (Study 4). 
3.2.1 Participants and procedure 
All the participants were undergraduate or postgraduate students in the University of 
Helsinki. For Studies 2 (N = 73; 55 women) and 3 (N = 83; 70 women), the participants 
were recruited via student mailing lists and tested in a laboratory in groups of 1-4. Study 
2 participants completed a state motivation manipulation, a risk judgment task, a filler 
task (to prolong the time lapse between completing the state motivation manipulation 
and the trait avoidance motivation measure), and finally, the trait avoidance motivation 
measure. The procedure for Study 3 was otherwise identical, but after making risk 
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judgments the participants also reported their negative mood. Study 4 participants (N = 
104, gender information was unavailable) were also recruited from student mailing lists, 
but the data were gathered by an online questionnaire. Study 4 participants first 
completed the state motivation manipulation task, then the emotional interpretation 
tasks, and finally, the trait avoidance motivation measure.  
3.2.2 Measures  
3.2.2.1 State motivation manipulation  
The manipulation of state motivation was based on the regulatory focus theory (Freitas 
& Higgins, 2002; Higgins, 1998). The participants in the state avoidance motivation 
condition listed and compared their current and childhood duties and obligations, and 
the participants in the state approach motivation listed and compared their current and 
childhood ideals and hopes (Study 2). For Studies 3 and 4, the manipulation was 
otherwise identical, but the comparison task was removed (i.e., the participants only 
listed their current and childhood duties or ideals).  
    The listing of duties is a standard manipulation of an avoidance state (Freitas & 
Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Previous research has shown 
that the priming of duties has several consequences reflecting avoidant behavior, such 
as experiencing it as more important to avoid undesired goals than to approach desired 
goals (Higgins et al., 1994), preferring vigilant (rather than eager) strategies of goal 
pursuit (Molden & Higgins, 2004), and being more attuned to avoidant-related feelings 
(calmness vs. anxiety; Shah & Higgins, 2001).   
3.2.2.2 Trait avoidance motivation 
Trait  avoidance  motivation  was  measured  with  the  BIS  scale  (see  3.1.2.2  for  details).  
Cronbach’s ?s for the scale were .76, .79, and .80 for Studies 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
3.2.2.3 Risk judgments (Studies 2-3) 
The participants judged the likelihood of 20 health risks for a person susceptible to the 
risk (e.g., they judged the likelihood of a risk related to overweight, such as high blood 
pressure, for an overweight person) on a seven-point scale (1= not at all likely; 7 = 
extremely likely). These judgments were averaged into a risk likelihood score (M = 4.82, 
SD = 0.58, Cronbach’s ? = .88 for Sample 1; M = 4.59, SD = 0.59, ? = .85 for Sample 
2). 
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3.2.2.4 Negative mood (Study 3) 
Negative mood items were picked from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988), and some items were added to represent low-arousal 
negative affect. Participants rated on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 
= very much) how irritable, distressed, sad, gloomy, and depressed they felt at the 
moment. Responses to these items were averaged into a negative mood score 
(Cronbach’s ? = .84). 
3.2.2.5 Emotional interpretation tasks (Study 4) 
Two emotional interpretation tasks were used. These tasks were modified after Rusting 
(1999). A word fragment task presented participants with 26 word fragments, 13 of 
which could be completed in a negative or neutral way and 13 of which could be 
completed in a positive or neutral way. The number of negative and positive words used 
as solutions to word fragments was computed, and these scores were used as indices of 
negative and positive interpretation, respectively. In the story completion task the 
participants were presented with the following sentence: “Linda is looking out at the 
sunset” and asked to write a short story about what is happening in the situation, 
including the thoughts and feelings of any characters in the story. Two independent 
judges blind to the participants’ state motivation condition and to the level of their trait 
avoidance motivation rated the amount of negative and positive content of the stories. 
These scores were used as indices of negative and positive interpretation, respectively. 
3.2.3 Results 
3.2.3.1 State × trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments 
As suggested in the Introduction, state avoidance motivation could raise people’s risk 
judgments despite their level of trait avoidance motivation, and thereby weaken the 
correlation between trait avoidance and risk perceptions. The results supported this idea: 
there  was  a  significant  or  marginally  significant  state  motivation  ×  trait  avoidance  
motivation interaction effect on risk judgments in both Studies 2 and 3 (? = -.23, t = -
1.95, p = .056, ?R2 = .05 in Study 2; ? = -.28, t = -2.14, p = .036, ?R2 = .05 in Study 3). 
For both Studies, the interaction was due to the fact that trait avoidance motivation 
strongly predicted risk judgments in the state approach group (? = .43, p < .05 for Study 
2; ? = .52, p < .001 for Study 3), but not in the state avoidance group (? = -.19, p = .20 
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for Study 2; ? = .21, p = .18 for Study 3). Hence, the results supported the idea that the 
moderating effect of state motivation has in previous studies obscured the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments. 
As for direct relations between avoidance motivation and risk perceptions, the 
present results were in line with previous research showing weak and variable 
correlations between these constructs: Pearson correlations indicated that trait avoidance 
motivation did not correlate with risk judgments in Study 2 (r = .13, ns.), but did do so 
in Study 3 (r = .35, p <  .01).  State  motivation  did  not  have  a  main  effect  on  risk  
judgments (F(1, 70) = 1.80, p = .32 for Study 2; F(1, 80) = 0.44, p = .51 for Study 3).  
In Study 3, negative mood was measured to explore it as a potential mediator of the 
effects of state and trait avoidance motivation on risk perceptions. However, although 
negative mood correlated with trait avoidance motivation (r = .25, p < .05), negative 
mood was not affected by state avoidance motivation (F(1, 80) = 2.06, p = .16), and it 
did not correlate with risk judgments (r = -.01, p = .95). Therefore, the conditions 
required for mediation were not met, and it was concluded that although state and trait 
avoidance motivation predicted risk judgments, self-reported negative mood did not 
mediate these relations. 
3.2.3.2 State × trait avoidance motivation and negative interpretation (Study 4) 
In Study 4, trait avoidance motivation correlated with the negative content of the story 
(r = .25, p < .05), but not with the number of negative or positive words used in the 
fragment task. State motivation predicted positive interpretation (F(1, 102) = 5.65, p < 
.05): those in an approach state used more positive words as solutions to word 
fragments in the positive version of the task than those in an avoidance state (Ms 7.60 
vs. 6.78, respectively). Unlike in the case of risk judgments, the interaction between 
state motivation and trait avoidance motivation did not predict any of the emotional 
processing variables (all |t|s < 1.66, all |?|s < .16, all ps > .10). 
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3.3 Studies 5-6 (Article III) 
Studies 5 and 6 examined the hypothesis that individual differences in threat 
identification moderate the relations between trait avoidance motivation and negatively 
biased processing (hypothesis b).  
3.3.1 Participants and procedure 
The participants (N = 36 (28 women) for Study 5; N = 53 (46 women) for Study 6) were 
recruited by an e-mail invitation to student mailing lists. Volunteers were mailed a 
package of personality and emotional processing measures to be completed at home and 
were scheduled with a testing session in the lab. During the session, the experimenter 
first collected the completed personality and emotional processing measures. Then, the 
participants completed a mood measure and a reaction time task measuring threat 
categorization performance (Study 5), or the recall task and the reaction time task 
(Study 6). 
3.3.2 Measures 
3.3.2.1 Emotional processing measures 
Negative interpretation task (Studies 5 and 6). The negative interpretation task was 
identical to the negative/neutral word fragment task used in Study 4. The participants 
were presented with 13 word fragments and instructed to fill in the missing letters in 
each item to complete a word. Items could be completed as negative or neutral words 
(e.g., K__u__u could be completed as kauhu (horror) or koulu (school)). The number of 
negative words used as solutions was used as an index of negative interpretation. 
Emotional recall task (Study 6). Participants rated the pleasantness of 12 positive (e.g., 
elated, serene), 12 negative (e.g., hostile, suffering), and 12 neutral (e.g., margin, 
weekly)  words  (neutral  words  served  as  fillers  to  make  the  task  more  difficult  and  to  
control for baseline differences in recall) on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
unpleasant)  to  5  (very pleasant).  To  make  sure  that  all  the  participants  processed  the  
words semantically, they were instructed to judge the pleasantness of the words based 
on the words’ meanings, not on the words’ phonetic pleasantness. Recall of positive and 
negative words was measured by a surprise free recall task given to the participants 
immediately after they returned the pleasantness judgments. They were given a blank 
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sheet of paper and asked to write down as many of the words that they could in three 
minutes. Indices of positive and negative recall were computed as the numbers of 
positive and negative words recalled, respectively. 
3.3.2.2 Threat identification task 
The threat identification task was based on tasks used by Robinson and colleagues 
(2005; Tamir et al., 2006). In the threat identification task, the participants were asked 
to decide as quickly as possible whether words were threatening or not. Threatening 
words were described as words that mean something substantially dangerous (killer, 
accident, murderer, viper, cancer, strike, aids, gun, kick), and nonthreatening words 
were described as words that had negative, but not substantially dangerous meanings 
(mess, tear, oily, stench, rust, dirt, debt, old, boring). By using only negative words we 
could ensure that the participants used a threat vs. non-threat categorization and not, for 
instance, a negative vs. neutral categorization. The participants first completed a 
practice block of 18 trials and then a target block of 36 trials. Each trial consisted of a 
centered presentation of one word. Using a standard keyboard, the participants were to 
hit the number 1 key if the word was threatening and the number 9 key if the word was 
not threatening. If the response was correct, the word was removed, and there was a 150 
ms  delay  before  the  next  trial  begun.  If  the  response  was  incorrect,  the  word  was  
replaced by a centered, capitalized red letter X, and the participants were to press the 
correct response key to proceed. When the correct key was pressed, the X was removed 
and there was a 150 ms delay before the next trial begun. The category labels 
“Threatening” and “Not threatening” were shown in the upper left and right corners of 
the display, respectively, throughout the task. The participants were told that both speed 
and accuracy were important, but that making a couple of errors was not a problem. 
In addition, the participants completed a neutral categorization task in which the 
categories were animal (e.g., horse, cat) vs. not animal (e.g., cloud, paper). Except for 
the categories and stimulus words, this task was identical to the threat identification task 
described above. The animal categorization task was used as a measure of baseline 
individual differences in categorization performance. Half of the participants completed 
the threat task first, and half completed the animal task first. 
Reaction times for the error trials in both the threat and animal blocks were excluded 
before computing threat identification speed (the mean accuracies for the threat task 
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were 97.5% (Study 5) and 96.4% (Study 6), and for the animal task, 98.5% (Study 5) 
and 97.8% (Study 6)). Reaction times were then log-transformed, and reaction times 2.5 
standard deviations above or below the participant’s mean (2.6% of the trials for Study 
5 and 2.4% of the trials for Study 6) were replaced by these cut-off values (Fazio, 
1990). Then, to control for baseline differences in categorization performance, threat 
block speed was regressed on animal block speed. The standardized residual from this 
regression was used as a purified measure of adeptness at threat identification (e.g., 
Tamir et al., 2006).  
The split-half reliability of the threat identification performance was examined by 
computing two separate estimates of both animal block speed and threat block speed. 
The  reduced  reaction  time  data  from  the  odd  and  even  trials  of  both  blocks  were  
averaged separately. Mean reaction times from the odd trials in the threat block were 
then regressed on mean reaction times from the odd trials in the animal block, and mean 
reaction times from the even trials in the threat block were regressed on mean reaction 
times from the even trials in the animal block, resulting in two independent estimates of 
purified threat identification. These estimates were highly correlated (r = .74, p < .001 
for Study 5, r = .79, p < .001 for Study 6), showing that threat identification 
performance had quite high internal consistency. Finally, speed and accuracy in all tasks 
were unrelated (all rs < .23, all ps > .11), showing that the participants did not adopt 
“fast but inaccurate” or “slow but accurate” response strategies, but tried to respond 
both quickly and accurately. 
3.3.2.3 Trait avoidance motivation 
Trait  avoidance  motivation  was  measured  with  the  Neuroticism  subscale  of  the  Short  
Five measure (Konstabel, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & Walkowitz, 2008; Lönnqvist et al., 
2008), developed to measure the same five personality factors that are measured by the 
NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The factor level correlations of the Finnish S5 with 
the Finnish translation of the NEO-PI-R are between .81 and .91 with an average of .87 
(Lönnqvist et al., 2008). The Neuroticism subscale is composed of 12 items (e.g. “I am 
often nervous, fearful, and anxious, and I worry that something might go wrong”). The 
participants  rated  on  a  seven-point  scale  from -3  to  3  to  what  extent  each  description  
applied to them (-3 = the description is completely wrong; 0 = I don’t know, difficult to 
say; 3 = the description is completely right). Cronbach’s ? for the subscale was .85. 
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3.3.2.4 Mood (Study 5) 
Because mood affects emotional processing (Bower, 1981; Rusting, 1998), positive and 
negative mood were measured in Study 5 in order to control for possible mood effects. 
Mood items were picked from the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980). The 
participants rated on a seven-point scale how elated, happy, excited, content, and 
cheerful they  felt  at  the  moment  (1  =  not at all,  7  =  very much). These ratings were 
averaged into a positive mood score (? = .74). The participants also rated how sad, 
gloomy, depressed, irritated, and anxious they  felt  at  the  moment  (1  =  not at all,  7  =  
very much). These ratings were averaged into a negative mood score (? = .86).  
3.3.3 Results 
As argued in the Introduction, if a good threat-identification skill helps high-trait-
avoidance motivation individuals to experience higher life satisfaction and less negative 
affect (Tamir et al., 2006), this skill could also buffer against the formation of negative 
processing biases among high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals, resulting in the 
variable relations between trait avoidance motivation and negative processing found in 
previous studies (e.g., Rusting & Larsen, 1998). However, in contrast to these 
expectations, threat identification tendency did not consistently moderate the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and emotional processing. For Study 5, the 
interaction between trait avoidance motivation and threat identification performance 
predicted the number of negative words used in the fragment task (? = .38, p < .05, t = 
2.38, ?R2 = .13). The obtained interaction was in accordance with predictions: trait 
avoidance motivation predicted positively the number of negative words used for those 
individuals slow in identifying threats, but negatively among those fast in identifying 
threats. However, this interaction was not replicated: in Study 6, the trait avoidance 
motivation × threat identification interaction predicted the number of negative words 
recalled (? = .27, p < .05, t = 2.09, ?R2 = .07) but not negative interpretation. 
Furthermore, the nature of the interaction predicting negative recall was not consistent 
with predictions (for a graphical depiction of the interaction, see original publication 
III). Hence, in the context of emotional processing, the results did not support the idea 
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that quick and accurate threat identification is beneficial to high-trait-avoidance 
individuals. 
Pearson correlations between trait avoidance motivation and emotional processing 
measures were also computed. Trait avoidance motivation had a direct relation with 
negative recall in Study 6 (r = .42, p < .01). There were no other significant correlations. 
Further, trait avoidance motivation was unrelated to the number of neutral words 
recalled  in  Study  6  (r = .03, p = .85), and the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and negative recall remained significant when controlling for neutral recall 
?? = .41, p < .01), showing that trait avoidance motivation was not related to the better 
recall in general but specifically to better recall of negative words. Finally, positive or 
negative mood (measured in Study 5) had no bearing on any of the results reported 
above. 
3.4 Study 7 (Article IV) 
Study 7 was conducted to examine the hypothesis that cognitive ability moderates the 
relation between trait avoidance motivation and adjustment so that trait avoidance 
motivation is related to (lower) adjustment only among individuals low in cognitive 
ability (hypothesis c).  
3.4.1 Overview and participants 
Study 7 was a part of a larger research project concerning the behavior of military 
conscripts (Mäkinen, 1991). All military conscripts enrolled at the Uusimaa Light 
Infantry Battalion (Helsinki) in October 1987 or February 1988, in total 626 male 
conscripts, were asked to participate. Of them, 600 agreed and signed an informed 
consent form. Of these individuals, 138 were eliminated because (a) their 20th birthdays 
did not occur during the term of their service (N = 108), or (b) they were classified as 
having a medical condition that limited their duty assignments (N = 30). Out of the 
remaining 462 conscripts, 152 were randomly selected for the sample (see Mäkinen, 
1991, for details) that participated in Study 7. The participants were, on average, 20 
years old (age range: 19-21). The self-report questionnaires and cognitive ability tests 
were administered to all the conscripts as part of daily exercises after 4 weeks of 
service. The psychiatric interview was conducted after approximately 5 weeks of 
service.  
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3.4.2 Measures 
3.4.2.1 Trait avoidance motivation 
Trait avoidance motivation was measured with the Emotional stability (vs. Neuroticism) 
scale of the Finnish translation of the fourth edition of the Sixteen Personality Factor 
Questionnaire (16PF; Cattell, 1981; Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970). The Cronbach’s ? 
of  this  13-item  scale  was  .76.  Note  that  the  scale  is  scored  so  that  higher  values  
represent lower levels of trait avoidance motivation. 
3.4.2.2 Cognitive ability 
Cognitive ability was measured with the Finnish Defense Forces Basic Ability Test, 
developed by the Finnish Defense Forces Education Development Center. This test 
battery is designed to measure general giftedness or intelligence. The battery comprises 
of 40-item verbal, visuospatial, and arithmetic reasoning subtests (see Tiihonen et al., 
2005, for further details). The subtest scores were highly intercorrelated, and they were 
summed to form a cognitive ability index (Cronbach’s ? = .84). 
3.4.2.3 Indicators of adjustment 
Self-evaluated adjustment. The  participants  rated  themselves  on  a  scale  from  1  (not 
difficult) to 3 (usually difficult) on the subsequent items: getting along with (a) peers, (b) 
conscript superiors, and (c) regular superiors; (d) taking on the conscript role; the 
capacity to receive (e) teaching and (f) orders; and (g) general adjustment. As these 
ratings were highly intercorrelated, they were summed (after reverse-coding each item) 
to represent self-evaluated adjustment. The sum score had a coefficient alpha reliability 
of .77. The self-ratings were gathered between the fifth and seventh weeks of service.  
Superior-evaluated adjustment. The participants’ closest superiors rated them at three 
distinct  times:  after  six  weeks  of  service,  after  four  months  of  service,  and  after  
completion of service (8 to 11 months). The rating scale used by these superiors, which 
ranged from 1 (poor)  to  4  (excellent), consisted of the following 10 items: (a) 
adjustment to peers; the ability to establish relationships with (b) peers and (c) 
superiors;  (d)  taking  on  the  conscript  role;  the  capacity  to  receive  (e)  training  and  (f)  
orders; coping with (g) physical and (h) mental strain; (i) performance as a leader; and 
(j) masculinity. As these ratings were highly intercorrelated within each of the three 
assessment occasions (the mean coefficient alpha reliability across the three occasions 
was .92), three sum scores of competence (one for each assessment occasion) were 
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computed across the 10 items. Furthermore, as the mean (test-retest) correlation for 
those three competence scores was high (mean r = .59), the three sum scores were 
averaged to form one index of superior-evaluated adjustment. 
Military passport ratings. After fulfilment of their  military service,  all  the participants 
received a military passport that included a general evaluation of  their  general  
competence and performance as conscripts. Each person’s evaluation, assessed on a 
scale from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent), represented averaged, collective evaluations made 
by the conscripts’ superiors. The military passport also included a similar five-point 
field evaluation,  which  reflected  the  performance  of  the  conscript  in  military  field  
exercises. The field evaluation score and general evaluation score were highly 
correlated (r = .84), and were therefore averaged into a military passport evaluation 
score.  
Sick days. The sick days variable represented the number of days the participant was 
exempt from duty due to some physical or mental ailment. 
Psychiatric evaluation. The final two indicators of adjustment were derived from a 
psychiatric interview. The approximately two-hour one-on-one psychiatric interview 
was semi-structured, covered several themes (e.g., family relations, sexual maturity, 
substance abuse), and was conducted by a psychiatrist specialized in both adolescent 
and adult psychiatry. At the time of the interviews, the psychiatrist was blind to the 
hypotheses of Study 7 and to the participants’ scores on all other measures. Immediately 
after each interview, the psychiatrist rated the participants on level of psychological 
adjustment and self-esteem on four-point scales (1 = poor; 4 = excellent). 
3.4.3 Results 
First, Pearson correlations of trait avoidance motivation and cognitive ability with 
adjustment were computed. As could be expected, trait avoidance motivation and 
cognitive ability correlated with several indicators of adjustment. Trait avoidance 
motivation correlated with self-evaluated adjustment (r = .33, p <  .01)  and  with  the  
psychiatrist’s evaluation of psychological adjustment (r = .25, p < .01); note that the 
trait avoidance motivation measure was reverse coded and that higher values 
represented lower levels of trait avoidance motivation. Cognitive ability correlated with 
superior-evaluated adjustment (r = .40, p <  .01),  the  military  passport  evaluation  (r = 
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.18, p < .05), and the psychiatrist’s evaluations of psychological adjustment (r = .25, p < 
.01) and (marginally) self-esteem (r = .15, p < .10). 
The interaction between trait avoidance motivation and cognitive ability was 
examined next. Recall that Study 7 set against each other the response process 
explanation and the buffer explanation concerning the moderating role of reaction time 
performance/cognitive ability on the association between trait avoidance motivation and 
indicators of adjustment. In line with the buffer explanation, cognitive ability moderated 
the relation between trait avoidance and both self-reported and non-self-reported 
adjustment. The interaction between trait avoidance motivation and cognitive ability 
was significant for the military passport evaluation (? = -.24, t = -3.00, p < .01, ?R2 = 
.05) and number of sick days (? = .20, t = 2.44, p <  .05,  ?R2 = .04), and marginally 
significant for self-evaluated adjustment (? = -.14, t = -1.83, p <  .10,  ?R2 = .01) and 
superior-evaluated adjustment (? = -.14, t = -1.83, p < .10, ?R2 = .02). In all cases, the 
nature of the interaction was as predicted: high trait avoidance motivation was related to 
lower adjustment (e.g., more sick days, a lower military passport grade) only among 
individuals low in cognitive ability. For individuals with high cognitive ability, trait 
avoidance  motivation  was  unrelated  to  adjustment  (for  a  graphical  depiction  of  these  
interactions, see original publication IV). However, the interaction did not predict 
psychiatric evaluations. 
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4 General discussion 
The results of this dissertation present some reasons as to why theoretically meaningful 
relations between trait avoidance motivation and other variables are not always found. 
In particular, the results showed that state motivation and cognitive ability moderate the 
relations between trait avoidance motivation and certain outcome variables (Studies 2-3 
and 7). These results contribute to those current directions of personality research that 
concern the dynamics of personality and its  interplay with other variables (Fournier et  
al., 2008; Funder, 2009; Mischel, 2004; Mischel et al., 2002; Shah & Higgins, 1997). 
The results of Studies 2-3 offer an explanation for the previously observed weak 
relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments: state motivation 
moderates this relation. These results also contribute to the literature concerning the 
cognitive aspects of traits (Borkenau & Mauer, 2007; Gomez et al., 2002; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005) in suggesting that the cognitive-affective tendency of evaluating risks 
may represent such cognitive aspect for trait avoidance motivation. The results 
concerning emotional processing were in line with previous research (e.g., Chan et al., 
2007; Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting & Larsen, 1998) in showing that trait avoidance 
motivation is inconsistently related to negatively biased processing (Studies 4-6). 
However, neither state motivation (Study 4) nor individual differences in threat 
identification (Studies 5-6) consistently moderated the relation between trait avoidance 
motivation and negatively biased processing. In this respect, the results of Studies 5 and 
6 were incongruent with the suggestion that good threat identification skills benefit 
high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals (Tamir et al., 2006). Finally, the results 
concerning trait avoidance motivation, cognitive ability, and adjustment showed that 
high-cognitive-ability individuals do not suffer from some of the harmful correlates of 
high trait avoidance motivation (Study 7). In so doing, these results also demonstrated 
that the moderating effect of cognitive ability on the relations of trait avoidance 
motivation with certain other variables does not result from a response bias (Robinson 
& Clore, 2007), but from the genuinely shielding influence of high cognitive ability 
(Perkins & Corr, 2005; 2006). 
In this chapter, the results are discussed from four perspectives. In the first section, 
they are evaluated in relation to the trait-congruency theory. The second section 
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discusses the results’ implications for the avoidance motivation system. The third 
section focuses on the results pertaining to the interplay between trait avoidance 
motivation,  adjustment,  and  cognitive  ability.  The  fourth  section  of  this  chapter  
considers the limitations of the research. Finally, the general conclusions of the thesis 
are presented in the fifth section. 
4.1 Avoidance motivation and trait-congruency 
Trait-congruency is an intuitively appealing theory about the cognitive correlates of 
personality traits (Borkenau & Mauer, 2007; Gomez et al., 2002; Rusting, 1998). 
However, evidence for the theory has been somewhat mixed (Bradley et al., 1993; 
Rogers & Revelle, 1998; Rusting, 1998; Rusting & Larsen, 1998). The present research 
studied trait-congruency in the context of trait avoidance motivation and found strong 
evidence for trait-congruency in one cognitive domain, that of risk judgments. Although 
trait avoidance motivation could on theoretical grounds be expected to predict risk 
judgments, previous studies (Gullone & Moore, 2000; Hampson et al., 2006) have 
found  only  weak  relations  between  the  constructs.  By  establishing  the  role  of  state  
motivation, the present results offer a way to reconcile this incongruity: trait avoidance 
motivation (conceptualized as dispositional avoidance motivation) is quite strongly 
related to risk judgments, but state motivation obscures this relation as people in an 
avoidance state make high risk judgments regardless of their level of trait avoidance 
motivation. Hypothesis (a) was therefore supported. Given that many situations evoke a 
temporary avoidance orientation (e.g., Lang et al., 1990), it seems possible that some of 
the participants in previous studies have been in an avoidance state and that this has 
weakened the correlation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments. 
 The results concerning risk judgments suggest that trait avoidance motivation can, to 
some extent, be defined in terms of, or be based on, cognitive-affective individual 
differences. The present results therefore contribute to the literature concerning the 
cognitive nature of traits (e.g., Borkenau & Mauer, 2007; Canli, 2008; Rusting, 1998) 
by suggesting that the tendency to judge risks could represent a cognitive aspect of trait 
avoidance motivation. 
It should be noted here that only measures tapping the dispositional avoidance 
motivation component of the trait avoidance motivation composite were used to test 
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hypothesis (a). Therefore, the results discussed above may be particular to individual 
differences in sensitivity and reactivity to negative events, and not concern individual 
differences in neuroticism. 
The results concerning trait avoidance motivation and emotional information 
processing biases, examined in Studies 4-6, were less conclusive than the results 
concerning trait avoidance motivation and risk judgment. Trait avoidance motivation 
was strongly related to negative recall but unrelated to negative interpretation in a 
fragment task (across three participant samples). Further, the present studies did not find 
reasons for the inconsistency of these relations; the intervening effects of the potential 
moderators studied – threat identification tendency and state motivation – did not 
consistently explain the weak relations between trait avoidance motivation and 
emotional processing. Thus, hypothesis (b) was not supported.  
The disparity between the results concerning risk judgments and emotional 
processing may reflect differences between the antecedents of judgments and 
information processing. It is well known that moods, emotions, and affective reactions 
influence judgments (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz, 
1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and that high trait avoidance motivation is related to 
higher emotional reactivity to negative events and stimuli (Carver & White, 1994; 
Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000). Based on these findings, it was suggested and found that 
high trait avoidance motivation is related to higher risk judgments. However, at the 
moment it is relatively unclear exactly how affective influences on judgments are 
conveyed. In contrast, a long-maintained idea in the trait-congruency literature is that 
emotional processing biases are caused by differences in emotional memory networks 
(Bower, 1981; Rusting, 1999). That is, high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals 
could have a larger or a better organized memory network consisting of negative 
memories and concepts than those with low trait avoidance motivation. Differences in 
this network could cause differences in emotional processing through spreading 
activation in the network (Rusting, 1999). Differences in such a network could also 
affect negative judgments (Zelenski & Larsen, 1999), but this is by no means self-
evident. Given that judgment and processing biases may have different antecedents, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that they have different relations with personality (see 
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Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, and Evans (1992) for discussion concerning the possible 
dissociation between emotion-congruent judgment and recall).  
Another source of discrepancy between the risk judgment results and the emotional 
processing results may have been that trait avoidance motivation was conceptualized as 
dispositional avoidance motivation in studies concerning risk judgments and as 
neuroticism in studies concerning emotional processing. Indeed, as already noted, it 
may be that dispositional avoidance motivation, but not neuroticism, is related to risk 
judgments. However, previous research has shown that both dispositional avoidance 
motivation and neuroticism are related to negatively biased processing, with 
correlations of roughly similar magnitude (e.g. Gomez et al., 2002; Rusting & Larsen, 
1998). Therefore, there is no a priori reason to assume that the emotional processing 
results would have been different if a measure of dispositional avoidance motivation 
had been used in Studies 5 and 6. Thus, while dispositional avoidance motivation seems 
to be strongly related to risk judgments (when the moderating role of state motivation is 
taken into account), the relation between trait avoidance motivation and negatively 
biased processing seems to be inconsistent.  
Because different emotional processing biases were studied in several samples, it is 
worth examining these results more closely in regard to the emotional memory network 
model (Bower, 1981; Rusting, 1999). The relation between trait avoidance motivation 
and negative recall was quite strong in Study 6, suggesting that high-trait avoidance 
motivation individuals could have a larger negative memory network than low-trait-
avoidance motivation individuals. But, a larger negative memory network would be 
expected to also make negative concepts more accessible. In fact, it has been suggested 
that emotional memory structures affect retrieval – the cognitive variable that was most 
strongly correlated with trait avoidance motivation – via heightened emotional concept 
accessibility (Bower, 1981; 1991). However, the results of the interpretation tasks 
tapping negative concept accessibility (Higgins, 1996; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 
1982) were unrelated to trait avoidance motivation in the present studies. Of course, 
besides individual differences, concept accessibility is also affected by situational 
factors (Higgins, 1996), and it could be that some situational factors made negative 
concepts less accessible for the high-trait-avoidance motivation participants in Studies 5 
and 6, despite their presumably larger negative memory networks. However, a relation 
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was found between trait avoidance motivation and negative content in the story task, 
and the story task results are also likely to be affected by the accessibility of negative 
material in the memory. 
Taken together, some relations predicted by the network model were found and some 
were not, even within the same sample of participants (in Studies 4 and 5). Therefore, 
the results suggest that the trait version of the network model could be partly correct, 
but that it is unlikely that the model stands in its simplest form (according to which 
larger/better organized trait-relevant networks accompany high levels of traits and that 
these networks affect performance in all emotional processing tasks). The results hence 
suggest that it could be useful to examine the network model in more detail, and 
perhaps revise it to some extent. For example, the present results showed that trait 
avoidance motivation can be related to producing more negative stories but unrelated to 
negative word fragment completion among the same individuals (Study 4). The reason 
for why the responses to these two tasks were dissociated could for instance be that the 
story task is affected by the accessibility of negative episodic memory content and the 
word fragment completion by the accessibility of negative concepts in semantic 
memory. Therefore, it could be that the proposed larger/better organized negative 
memory network exists, partly independently, in both episodic and semantic stores, and 
that it affects negatively biased processing through accessibility, as has been suggested 
(Bower, 1991). However, contextual factors could differently affect the accessibility of 
episodic vs. semantic memory content, leading to the observed dissociation (Study 6). 
The above analysis is of course speculative, but the point is that the present results 
suggest that such analyses – both theoretical and empirical – may be needed to refine 
the network model to make more precise predictions and to obtain a more accurate 
picture of the relation between personality and emotional processing. 
In sum, the results concerning emotional processing suggest, in line with quite a few 
previous studies (Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Gomez & Gomez, 2002; Rogers & Revelle, 
1998; Rusting, 1998; Rusting & Larsen, 1998), that there is a relation between trait 
avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing, but that this relation is not 
consistent and straightforward. Also in line with previous studies, the results imply that 
this relationship is probably moderated by some factor(s). However, state motivation, 
threat identification tendency, and natural mood do not seem to serve as such 
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moderators. On a final note, some previous studies have suggested that the relation 
between trait avoidance motivation and negative recall is the strongest for self-relevant 
negative material (Martin, Ward, & Clark, 1983). In contrast, the present results (Study 
6) supported the view that the negative recall bias of high-trait-avoidance individuals is 
not exclusive to self-relevant issues.  
4.2 The “what” and “how” of avoidance motivation 
The present results have certain theoretical as well as applied implications concerning 
the nature and workings of the avoidance system. First, apart from providing some 
partial answers to the “when and “what” question for trait avoidance motivation, the 
result according to which trait avoidance motivation has a strong relationship with risk 
judgments  could  also  suggest  an  answer  to  the   “how” question.  High  trait  avoidance  
motivation is related to, for example, worrying and rumination (de Bruin, Rassin, & 
Muris, 2007; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2008), somatic distress 
(Neeleman et al., 2004), susceptibility to anxiety disorders (Watson et al., 2005), and a 
preference for vigilant strategies of goal pursuit (Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & Higgins, 
2004). A tendency to judge risks as more likely could contribute to these outcomes. For 
instance, judging failure in a task as likely could enhance the use of vigilant strategies in 
the task (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Spiegel et al., 2004) in order to lower the possibility 
of making errors. In addition, judging health problems as more likely could increase 
somatic  complaints  and  somatic  distress.  In  general,  as  we  know  that  people  tend  to  
automatically evaluate objects around them (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Zajonc, 1980), individual differences in evaluative tendencies 
could cause individuals to experience their surroundings quite differently and therefore 
contribute to a wide range of individual differences in affect and well-being. The 
continual stream of events that are experienced as dangerous could maintain chronic 
vigilance and anxiety, which could even contribute to the development of anxiety 
disorders. Hence, a negative judgmental tendency could serve as a mechanism through 
which high trait avoidance motivation conveys some of its adverse effects. 
The results also have implications for the theoretical nature of the avoidance system. 
The nature of the interaction obtained between trait avoidance motivation and risk 
judgments in Studies 2 and 3 (Article II) allowed a comparison between two theories 
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concerning the workings of the avoidance motivation system. As noted above, the trait 
version of the network model of affect (Bower, 1981; Rusting, 1999) suggests that traits 
(e.g., trait avoidance motivation) are related to larger/better organized memory networks 
of trait-relevant concepts. This theory further suggests (Rusting, 1999) that matching 
states (e.g., state avoidance motivation, negative mood) activate this network 
effectively, leading to particularly strong effects on relevant behaviors and cognitions 
among those with matching states and traits (e.g., particularly high risk judgments 
among high-trait-avoidance individuals in an avoidance state). However, this was not 
found in the present research: state avoidance motivation did not influence risk 
judgments differently for high- vs. low-trait avoidance motivation individuals. 
Furthermore, the negative mood that, according to the trait version of the network 
model, could also have enhanced the risk judgments of high-trait-avoidance motivation 
individuals did not moderate the relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk 
judgments. 
In contrast to the network model’s predictions, the nature of the state × trait 
avoidance motivation interaction on risk judgments showed that both state and trait 
avoidance motivation raised people’s risk judgments to a similar degree (relative to the 
judgments of low-trait-avoidance motivation individuals in an approach state). This 
pattern  of  results  was  congruent  with  a  view  of  avoidance  motivation  as  an  “on-off”  
system (Shah & Higgins, 1997). According to this view, avoidance goals are viewed as 
necessities, i.e., they must be reached no matter what (Shah & Higgins, 1997; see also 
Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). This is a plausible assumption given that avoidance goals 
usually involve withdrawing from a dangerous situation or avoiding threatening issues. 
Not reaching these kinds of goals may lead to severe and possibly fatal consequences. 
Because of this, it could be useful if once sufficiently activated, the avoidance system 
would affect one’s behavior, cognition, and affect with all its strength, and its activation 
could thus not be decreased or increased with any further stimulation. The present 
results (Studies 2-3) supported this idea. 
It should be noted that the idea of the avoidance system operating on an on-off 
principle  is  not  incongruent  with  the  idea  of  the  network  model  as  such.  That  is,  it  is  
possible that high trait avoidance motivation and state avoidance motivation are related 
to the activation of cognitive structures representing negative valence, and that 
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avoidance motivation affects risk judgments through such an activation. The point of 
the on-off theory is merely that this activation is not enhanced by combining the two 
sources of avoidance motivation (state and trait).  
As discussed in the Introduction, several motivation researchers and a considerable 
amount of empirical data have suggested the existence of two independent motivation 
systems, an avoidance system and an approach system (e.g. Carver et al., 2000; Carver 
& White, 1994; Elliot & Trash, 2002; Gray, 1982). Therefore, the results concerning the 
interaction between state and trait avoidance motivation evoke an interesting parallel 
question about the interplay between state and trait approach motivation. Would state 
and trait approach motivation raise approach-related judgments (or behavior, or affects) 
to a similar degree as seems to be the case for state and trait avoidance motivation and 
risk judgments? This question was not addressed in the present research, but unlike 
avoidance goals, approach goals are not likely to be viewed as necessities (Shah & 
Higgins, 1997), because not reaching an approach goal is not usually dangerous (for 
instance, being refused a date is disappointing, but it will not kill you). Therefore, the 
activation of the approach system might increase gradually rather than be fully activated 
after a certain threshold of activation has been reached. Thus, state and trait approach 
could have an additive (i.e., state and trait approach would independently increase 
outcomes) or a synergistic effect (i.e., state approach would enhance the effect of high 
trait approach) on, for instance, positive evaluations. In light of the present risk 
judgments results, the interaction between state and trait approach in predicting 
approach-related outcomes is an interesting question for future research. 
The present studies also examined a theory presented by Robinson and colleagues 
(Robinson, Meier, & Vargas, 2005; Tamir et al., 2006) concerning the nature of the 
avoidance system. According to this theory, high-trait-avoidance individuals (i.e., 
people who tend to worry about threats) would benefit from good threat identification 
skills. By identifying actual threats quickly, such individuals could deal with them 
effectively and stop worrying about issues that are only potentially, but not actually, 
dangerous (Tamir et al., 2006). In contrast, good threat-identification skills would not 
carry similar benefits for low-trait-avoidance individuals, who do not tend to worry 
about threats. This theory was examined in the context of emotional processing in 
Studies 5 and 6. However, no evidence for such a moderation effect was found. Hence, 
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the results did not support the idea of good threat identification skills functioning as a 
buffer for high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals (Tamir et al., 2006).  
4.3 Trait avoidance motivation, cognitive ability, and 
adjustment 
The results of Study 7 (Article IV) supported hypothesis (c) by showing that cognitive 
ability moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation, conceptualized as 
neuroticism,  and  self-evaluated  as  well  as  objective  measures  of  adjustment.  In  
particular, high trait avoidance motivation was associated with lower self-evaluated and 
superior-evaluated adjustment and a higher number of sick days during the course of 
military service only among those with low cognitive ability. The moderating effect of 
cognitive ability on the relations between trait avoidance motivation and other variables 
has been suggested to result from the response process (Robinson & Clore, 2002; 2007), 
but also from a genuinely shielding influence of high cognitive ability (Perkins & Corr, 
2005, 2006). The present research (Study 7) supported the latter view. 
The  results  of  Study  7  are  of  importance  given  that  they  present  an  exception  to  a  
relation considered as one of the strongest in research on individual differences – the 
one between trait avoidance motivation and different forms of maladjustment (e.g., 
Costa & McCrae, 1980; Duggan, Sham, Lee, & Minne, 1995; Roberts & Kendler, 1999; 
Steel et al., 2008). What is more, this exception was established for several, relatively 
valid indicators of adjustment, such as consensus evaluations of performance made by 
5-10 individuals that had closely followed the target individual for 8-11 months and an 
objective indicator of physical and mental illness (the sick days variable). The results of 
Study 7 suggest, for instance, that the surprisingly low relation found between 
neuroticism and job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991) could be partly explained by 
the moderating influence of cognitive ability. 
Concerning the reasons for the moderating effects of cognitive ability, it has been 
suggested that high trait avoidance motivation consumes attentional resources in a 
stressful situation, and that high cognitive ability helps people to cope with this 
cognitive overload (Perkins & Corr, 2006). However, the present results are not entirely 
consistent with this view because the moderating effect of cognitive ability was also 
found on criterion measures derived from behavior in non-stressful situations. Although 
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superior-evaluated adjustment was partly based on performance in presumably stressful 
situations,  it  also  contained  evaluations  of  the  targets’  ability  to  form  social  
relationships. Furthermore, high cognitive ability lowered the number of sick days 
among high-trait-avoidance individuals. These results imply that the beneficial effects 
of high cognitive ability exceed those of merely helping with momentary cognitive 
overload.  
The particular mechanism through which high cognitive ability buffers against the 
adverse effects of high trait avoidance motivation was not examined in the present 
research. The broad array of implications discussed above suggests, however, that the 
mechanism may be some rather general process, perhaps based on a constructive 
reconceptualization of negative experiences (Kremen et al., 2007) or on the better 
problem-solving skills (Gottfredson, 2004) of high-cognitive ability individuals. 
Whatever the shielding effect of high cognitive ability is and wherever it derives from, 
it seems to help people to adjust socially and to cope better with the physical and 
psychological distresses and illnesses that they face.  
The results concerning the psychiatric evaluation suggest that the shielding effect of 
high cognitive ability, although quite general, does not extend to all forms of 
adjustment.  In  light  of  these  results,  it  seems  that  while  the  beneficial  effects  of  high  
cognitive ability help high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals to cope better in their 
everyday lives, these effects do not change certain aspects of a person that can be 
detected by an experienced mental health professional. For instance, it could be that all 
high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals experience more negative affect in 
problematic situations, thus contributing to a more negative implicit self-concept, but 
that those high-trait-avoidance motivation individuals with high cognitive ability are 
better able to deal with the problematic situations (Gottfredson, 2004), leading to a 
positive explicit self-concept. Given that implicit and explicit self-views may be 
unrelated (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006), this explanation seems worth examining. 
4.4 Limitations 
A limitation common to several of the present studies concerned the size and 
representativeness of participant samples. Many of the samples were quite small and 
biased in their gender distribution, and all the participants were Finnish. To increase 
56 
 
confidence in the conclusions, it would be desirable to examine the relations found in 
the present studies in larger groups and more gender-balanced groups, and among 
individuals with other ethnic or cultural backgrounds.  
The sample of participants in Study 7 was most unrepresentative in that it consisted 
solely of men conducting their military service. This naturally raises some questions as 
to the generalizability of the obtained results, especially given that women tend to score 
higher than men on trait avoidance motivation measures (Costa, Terracciano, & 
McCrae, 2001; Jorm et al., 1998). However, there is some evidence showing that both 
trait avoidance motivation and cognitive ability predict at least health-related outcomes 
identically for both genders (Gottfredson, 2004; Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 
2007). These results speak against the possibility of between-gender differences in the 
operation of trait avoidance motivation and cognitive ability. It remains possible, 
however, that the interplay of these two variables differs between genders. For instance, 
women might experience more anxiety than men after a stressful situation (Schmaus, 
Laubmeier, Boquiren, Herzer, & Zakowski, 2008), perhaps to the extent that the 
moderating effects of high cognitive ability would not be enough to buffer against 
distress or low performance. Furthermore, the participants in Study 7 were in an unusual 
and stressful life situation (conducting a military service) that may have distorted the 
results. For instance, it is possible that cognitive ability only buffers against the negative 
consequences of high trait avoidance motivation in a very structured environment (such 
as the military) where goals are clearly defined and straightforward, but not in less 
structured  everyday  life.  Thus,  given  the  relatively  wide  implications  of  the  Study  7  
results, it would be important to examine trait avoidance motivation × cognitive ability 
interactions also among women and individuals in the midst of a regular life phase. 
A limitation particular to Studies 2-4 (Article II) was that no motivationally neutral 
control group was included as all the participants were either in an avoidance state or an 
approach state. Therefore, it remained unclear whether state avoidance raised risk 
judgments relative to a neutral state or whether state approach lowered risk judgments 
relative to a neutral state, or both. Although the most natural interpretation of the results 
is that state and trait avoidance motivation operate similarly with regards to risk 
judgments, it is impossible to say with certainty which of the above-described effects 
caused  the  results,  and  it  would  be  desirable  to  examine  the  interaction  effect  with  a  
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neutral group. A further limitation of these studies is that participants vulnerable to the 
risks in question were not included; the results may not hold for the risk judgments of 
such individuals because vulnerability to risks may raise judgments of those risks 
regardless of personality. 
A more minor limitation of the studies was that not all negative processing biases 
were studied in relation to all moderators. For instance, in the light of the results of 
Study 7, it seems possible that cognitive ability could moderate the relation between 
trait avoidance motivation and negative biases. Some recent research has obtained 
results supporting this idea in the context of attention (Lonigan & Vasey, 2009). 
However, the present thesis focused more on the moderators of trait avoidance 
motivation than on trait-congruency. In future studies, researchers frustrated with the 
inconsistency of trait-(in)congruent results may wish to examine cognitive ability as a 
moderator. 
On a final note concerning the limitations of the research, it has been maintained on 
several  occasions  in  the  present  dissertation  that  the  relations  of  trait  avoidance  
motivation with risk judgment and negatively biased processing have been weak or 
inconsistent  in  previous  studies  as  well  as  in  the  present  ones.  However,  it  should  be  
noted that there is no absolute criterion for weak or strong in this context. Responses to 
information processing tasks are much more susceptible to measurement error than, for 
instance,  self-reports  of  personality.  Furthermore,  it  also  is  possible  that  emotional  
processing tendencies do not represent stable individual difference variables at all, 
although there is some evidence for test-retest reliability among such measures (Strauss, 
Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005). However, it is clear that situational variables (e.g., 
fatigue, motivation) affect information processing tasks much more strongly than they 
affect responses to personality questionnaires (Robinson, 2007). Therefore, such 
possible empirical and methodological limitations of the emotional processing research 
should be kept in mind when considering such criticism of trait-congruency theory that 
is  based  on  the  inconsistency  of  empirical  results.  More  research  on  the  nature  of  the  
emotional processing variables is needed to fully understand what kind of relations 
could be expected between personality and emotional processing, and what kind of 
relations there actually are. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The results of the present thesis suggest that state motivation and cognitive ability serve 
as moderators of trait avoidance motivation. These results have implications for our 
understanding of personality as well as for research using trait avoidance motivation as 
a predictor variable. Personality traits are related to behavior and cognitive processing, 
but these relations are not always straightforward. The relations of traits with such 
outcome variables may often be moderated incidentally by moods, other states, and 
situational  factors  such  as  the  behavior  of  others;  however,  recent  research  and  
theorizing suggests that there may be stable patterns of moderation (“if…then…” 
signatures) that may capture individual differences with more precision than traits alone. 
The work by Fournier and colleagues (2008, 2009) focuses on the moderating role of 
situations, as the present Studies 2-4, but there could also be interactions between 
personality and other individual difference variables, such as those observed in Study 7. 
It seems that identifying such interactions may be informative concerning the nature and 
workings of personality. 
The results also contributed to the long line of work conducted on trait-congruency. 
The present results are in line with previous work (Chan et al., 2007; Rusting, 1998; 
Rusting & Larsen, 1998) in showing that relations between trait avoidance motivation 
and negative processing biases are cumbersome, and perhaps disappointingly, the 
moderators studied in the present research did not help to understand these relations 
better. However, together with previous studies, the present thesis points to the need to 
scrutinize theories on trait-congruency to accommodate them with empirical findings.  
As compared to emotional processing, trait-congruency has received less attention in 
the domain of risk judgments. This may be because risk judgment has traditionally been 
studied in judgment and decision-making (J/DM) research, which has remained 
dissociated from personality psychology. J/DM research typically focuses on the 
universal rules behind risky choice. As a consequence, individual differences have not 
received much attention in this line of work (Weber & Johnson, 2009). The present 
thesis suggests a way to connect the J/DM tradition with personality psychology by 
showing that individual differences in risk judgment are related to the trait of avoidance 
motivation, as long as the moderating role of state motivation is taken into account. 
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In sum, the results of the seven studies presented here offer new information about 
how individuals differing in their negative feelings, reactions, and motivation differ in 
their thoughts and actions, and why. The results bridge a gap in the previous literature 
concerning these individual differences and risk judgments. They also add to the 
cumulating literature on the variability and inconsistency of trait-congruent processing, 
suggesting a need to revise some of the assumptions guiding this line of research. 
Furthermore, the results merge different lines of research concerning the cognitive 
moderators of personality, and suggest a plausible interpretation of previous, 
unconnected results. Finally, the present thesis contributes to the current research 
directions of personality psychology by demonstrating two novel interactions, one 
involving personality and cognitive ability, and one involving personality and situation. 
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